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Medical Malpractice: Expert Opinion Unnecessary to
Establish Claim Based on Doctrine of Informed
Consent
Jerome Cornfeldt's wife entered a hospital for surgery to remove
a portion of her stomach that had been diagnosed as cancerous.'
Routine pre-operative tests indicated the possibility of hepatitis, a
condition that allegedly would have materially increased the risks of
the surgery.' Both the patient's surgeon and anesthesiologist were
aware of the test results3 but neither discussed the results or their
implications with the patient.' The operation proceeded without inci-
dent,5 but shortly after the operation the patient died of hepatitis. 6
Cornfeldt commenced a wrongful death action against the sur-
geon and anesthesiologist, alleging that they were negligent in failing
to disclose to his wife the increased risks implied by the pre-operative
test results.' The trial court judge refused to instruct the jury on this
issue, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.' The Su-
1. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Minn. 1977).
2. Specifically, blood tests indicated an alkaline phosphatase level of 145 com-
pared to a normal range of 30 to 85, and a serum glutamic-oxaloacetic transaminase
level that was "off the chart" with a reading above 250 compared to a normal range of
10 to 50. Id. at 690. These tests are not specifically diagnostic but indicate a possible
malfunction in any of several organs or the presence of hepatitis. Id. at 690. See note
6 infra.
3. See 262 N.W.2d at 690. Neither doctor, however, admitted knowing that the
test results materially increased the risks. Id. at 699. Plaintiff, however, introduced
expert testimony indicating that under accepted medical practice a surgeon or anes-
thesiologist would have been aware of the increased risk foretold by the test results.
Id.
4. The patient signed a written consent form to the operation but the opinion of
the court does not indicate whether it was signed before or after the test results became
known. Id. at 699. Thus, even though the written consent may have been fully
"informed" at the time it was given, that consent apparently was not considered by
the court to be particularly important. The anesthesiologist met with the patient after
becoming aware of the test results. He secured her approval of the use of Fluothane, a
halothane anesthetic, but he made no mention of the test results or their implications.
Id. at 690. At trial, plaintiff alleged that halothane aggravates hepatitis. Id. at 702.
5. During the course of the surgery it was discovered that the stomach was not,
as previously believed by the doctors, cancerous. Id. at 691.
6. The cause of death, according to the plaintiff, was halothane hepatitis. Id. at
702. Had the surgery been postponed, there was an 85-90% probability that the
patient would have recovered from hepatitis within a month to six weeks. Id. at 691.
7. Id. at 689, 691. Several other claims were also made against the physicians,
including negligence in proceeding with the operation in view of the test results, negli-
gence in the selection of the Fluothane anesthetic, and negligence in failing to consult
a specialist to interpret the test results. Id. at 691.
8. Id.
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preme Court of Minnesota reversed, holding that a cause of action
exists for "negligent nondisclosure of risks attendant to proposed or
alternative methods of treatment";9 that the appropriate standard of
conduct for physicians may be established by the jury without refer-
ence to the established customs of the medical community;'0 and
that, to meet the causation requirement in such actions, plaintiff
must show that a reasonable person in the patient's position would
not have consented to the treatment if the risks had been fully dis-
closed." Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977).
An established precept of American medical jurisprudence is
that a patient has a right to chart his own medical destiny-to accept
or reject treatment on the basis of complete and correct information
supplied to him by his physician.'2 There are, however, conflicting
considerations that limit this right: unreasonable disclosure require-
ments must not be imposed on physicians, and physicians are legiti-
mately entitled to some degree of professional discretion in providing
information to the patient.
The traditional means of enforcing the patient's right to self-
determination was by imposing liability for battery on physicians
when their treatment deviated from the treatment consented to by
the patient.'3 Liability in these cases resulted from application of the
9. Id. at 699.
10. Id. at 702.
11. Id. at 701.
12. Justice Cardozo is often quoted in support of this proposition: "Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (overruled on other grounds in Bing
v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957)). A more recent decision
on informed consent noted that "Anglo-American law starts with the premise of
thorough-going self-determination." Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d
1093, 1104 (1960), clarified and reh. denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). See
also cases cited in notes 19-20 infra.
The closely related right of bodily privacy is protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, by the ninth amendment, and under the penumbra of
the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). Thus, courts that recognize this right often hold that the individual has a
right to make an informed refusal of medical treatment, even lifesaving treatment.
See, e.g., In re Brook's Estate, 32 IU.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). But see Application
of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). For a discussion of the interrelationship between the
doctrine of informed consent and Constitutional privacy, see Note, Compulsory Medi-
cal Treatment: The State's Interest Re-Evaluated, 51 MIN. L. REv. 293 (1966); Note,
Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L. REv. 1632 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Wells v. Van Nort, 100 Ohio St. 101, 125 N.E. 910 (1919) (consent
to appendectomy; removal of Fallopian tubes); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P.
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general rule in tort law that the privilege, gained through consent, to
commit an otherwise tortious act is limited to conduct or acts sub-
stantially equivalent to those for which consent was granted. 4
More recently, courts have occasionally imposed liability for bat-
tery on physicians who failed to disclose major, known risks of the
proposed treatment, even though the patient consented to the treat-
ment performed. Battery was found, for example, when a physician
failed to tell a patient that loss of hearing might result from proposed
surgery. 5 The rationale of these cases is that the inadequate disclo-
sure of consequences invalidates the consent, thereby eliminating the
physician's privilege to touch the patient."6
Most courts now recognize that the doctrine of informed consent
is more properly analyzed under the theory of negligence. Beginning
with a 1957 California decision,17
[i]t began to be recognized that [the inquiry] was really a matter
of the standard of professional conduct, since there will be some
patients to whom disclosure may be undesirable or even dangerous
. . .; and that what should be done is a matter for professional
judgment. . . . Accordingly, the prevailing view now is that the
action, regardless of its form, is in reality one for negligence. .... 3
Courts that apply a negligence theory of informed consent dis-
agree on the appropriate standard of professional conduct. 9 Most
courts require the plaintiff to show that the defendant failed to con-
form to accepted practices of the medical profession. Expert testi-
mony is required to establish this standard, but the exact substance
96 (1913) (consent to draining of foot inflammation; removal of a bone). A collection
of the cases can be found in Morris, Medical Malpractice-A Changing Picture!, 1956
INS. L.J. 319. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 102-05 (4th
ed. 1971).
14. See, e.g., Shiffer v. Broadhead, 126 Pa. 260, 17 A. 592 (1889) (consent to cut
trees held limited to a customary size as defined by local custom); Teolis v. Moscatelli,
44 R.I. 494, 119 A. 161 (1923) (consent to fist fight held not to equal consent to knife
fight). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 103-05.
15. See Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
16. See generally Note, Informed Consent as a Theory of Medical Liability, 1970
WXis. L. REv. 879, 883-85.
17. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317
P.2d 170 (1957).
18. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 165.
19. Compare Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409-10, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960)
(physician must disclose all risks that the relevant medical community considers sig-
nificant) with Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972) (physician must disclose all risks a reasonable person would consider
significant). See generally Comment, New Trends in Informed Consent? 54 NE. L.
REv. 66 (1975).
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of the required testimony varies. 21 In a strong and growing minority
of jurisdictions, however, courts have adopted a "jury standard" of
disclosure, requiring the physician to disclose all risks that a reasona-
ble person would consider significant regardless of whether such dis-
closure is required by accepted practice in the medical profession.2 '
Expert testimony is not required to establish this standard.2
Courts have justified the adoption of the jury standard of disclo-
sure on several grounds. First, they reason, a "conspiracy of silence"
in the medical profession might prevent plaintiffs with legitimate
claims from producing the expert testimony needed to establish the
medical community standard.? Second, disclosure of risks has been
thought to be nontechnical and simple enough so that a jury can
determine on its own whether the physician's conduct was reasona-
ble. 4 Third, some courts have questioned whether a professional
20. Courts formulate the relevant medical community standard in a variety of
ways. See, e.g., DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 543, 173 A.2d 333, 336 (1961) (general
practice of the medical profession in the locality); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So.2d 226,
228 (Fla. App. 1965) (accepted practice in the community among gastroenterologists
and physicians of defendant's standing); Green v. Hussey, 127 Ill. App. 2d 174, 184,
262 N.E.2d 156, 161 (1970) (reasonable practice in the same school in the same circum-
stances); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967) (reasonable medical practi-
tioner in the same school and the same or similar community under the same or similar
circumstances). See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084, 1091 (1973).
21. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 n.90 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
22. See id. at 792; Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 236, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 509,
502 P.2d 1, 8 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107,
clarified and reh. denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md.
432, 444, 379 A.2d 1014, 1023 (1977); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 625, 295 A.2d
676, 688 (1972); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 227 N.W.2d
647, 655 (1975).
23. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 792, n.124 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972). Whether a conspiracy of silence in fact exists in the medical profes-
sion has been the subject of considerable debate. The evidence and research that tends
to show the existence of such a conspiracy is collected in Comment, Informed Consent
in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 1405-06 (1967). An HEW commission
on medical malpractice, however, stated that the conspiracy, "if it did indeed exist, is
much less prevalent now." U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 36 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S MAL-
PRACTICE REPORT]. This conclusion seems to be borne out by the open advertising of
professional medical witnesses in attorney's professional journals. See, e.g., 64
A.B.A.J. 927 (1978) ("Hundreds of satisfied clients").
24. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972). This rationale is in accordance with an exception to the expert testimony
requirement of the rules of evidence, see FED. R. Evm. 702, that is often made in
professional malpractice actions in which the alleged negligent behavior is nontechni-
cal and simple. See, e.g., Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936) (failure to
remove a sponge from the patient's abdomen); Evans v. Roberts, 172 Iowa 653, 154
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standard of disclosure exists at all.2 If one does exist, some have
suggested it is apt to be "vague and nebulous. 26 Finally, and most
importantly, some courts have rejected the professional standard of
disclosure because it effectively allows the medical community to set
its own standards. The patient's rights are thus viewed as being given
inadequate protection under the community practice standard. As
one court reasoned, "[r]espect for the patient's right of self-
determination . . .demands a standard set by law for physicians
rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon them-
selves."17
Despite these rationales, the jury standard has been thoroughly
criticized. The organized medical profession has been particularly
critical of the jury standard, viewing it as a boon to plaintiffs, and
has petitioned legislatures for statutory reversal in those states where
courts have adopted the standard.2 Physicians and other critics have
argued that the jury standard of disclosure requires the physician to
conduct lengthy "medical seminars" for the patient, that the higher
risk of liability with the jury standard will lead to higher medical
malpractice insurance premiums that will be passed on to the medi-
cal consumer, and that patients cannot be trusted to make prudent
decisions after full disclosure and therefore only physicians can pro-
perly interpret and balance risks.29
Disagreement among courts applying the negligence theory to
informed consent actions is not confined to whether the appropriate
standard of care is defined by the medical or lay community; courts
also disagree on the appropriate test of causation. Generally, to meet
the causation requirement in informed consent actions, plaintiffs
must show that they would not have consented to the treatment that
produced their injury if an adequate disclosure of risks had been
N.W. 923 (1915) (tongue cut off while removing adenoids); Steinke v. Bell, 32 N.J.
Super. 67, 107 A.2d 825 (1954) (pulling wrong tooth). See generally W. PRossER, supra
note 13, at 164-65.
25. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.41 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 442, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (1977). See
generally Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CAUrF. L. REV. 1396,
1404-05 (1967).
26. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 442, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (1977). See Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Comment,
supra note 25, at 1404.
27. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972) (footnotes omitted). See also Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 624-26, 295
A.2d 676, 687-88 (1972).
28. See generally Davis, Informed Consent-A Review and Analysis, 11 TRAL
LAw. Q., Spring/Summer 1976, at 64.
29. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 441-42, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (1977); Mark-
ham, The Doctrine of Informed Consent-Fact or Fiction? 10 FoRUM 1073, 1077 (1975).
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made." Most courts apply a subjective test of causation, whereby
they seek to determine whether the particular plaintiff would have
withheld consent for treatment had risks been properly disclosed.3'
Some courts apply an objective test, whereby they seek to determine
whether a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would have
withheld consent.2
Prior to Cornfeldt, Minnesota courts used the battery theory in
informed consent actions. Development of the battery theory in Min-
nesota paralleled that in other jurisdictions. Initially, liability was
imposed when the treatment deviated substantially from the treat-
ment to which the patient consented. In Mohr v. Williams," for ex-
ample, a court imposed liability on a doctor who operated on the left
ear when the patient had consented to an operation on the right.
Later, Minnesota courts imposed liability for failure to disclose mate-
rial risks, reasoning that the inadequate disclosure of risks vitiated
the consent. In Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital Co.,3" for example,
the physician did not disclose that the proposed treatment might
result in severance of the patient's spermatic ducts, and the court
held that a jury question was presented.3 In applying the battery
theory, Minnesota courts did not address whether the scope of the
duty to disclose should be set by juries or by professional custom, or
whether causation should be objectively or subjectively tested. Al-
though the Bang court recognized that "reasonable latitude must be
allowed a physician in a particular case so as to not unreasonably
interfere with the exercise of his discretion,"36 the court did not at-
tempt to delineate where discretion ended and battery began.
The Cornfeldt court chose to apply the negligence theory, but the
court's opinion did not state the rationale for that choice." Instead,
30. See Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rxv.
628, 646 n.70 (1970).
31. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alaska 1975); Shetter v.
Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 367, 409 P.2d 74, 83, modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d
45 (1965); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628-29, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972).
32. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 227 N.W.2d
647, 655 (1975).
33. 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
34. 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
35. Id. at 432, 88 N.W.2d at 189.
36. Id. at 33, 88 N.W.2d at 190 (discussing Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261,268,
104 N.W. 12, 14 (1905)).
37. It seems likely, however, that the court relied on the same reasoning used by
other courts that have chosen the negligence theory. See text accompanying notes 17-
18 supra.
The court stated that the battery theory would be retained where "the treatment
consists of a touching that is of a substantially different nature and character from that
[Vol. 63:695
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the court focused on its reasons for choosing to adopt the jury stan-
dard and the objective test of causation,
Mindful of the split of authority as to how to establish a standard
of reasonable care, 8 the court appeared to seek a compromise; its
express aim being to find an "accommodation" between
"professional competence and patient self-determination."3 9 In so
doing, it articulated the following standard of disclosure:
Failure to disclose a risk that would have been disclosed under ac-
cepted medical practice thus should be a sufficient, but not a neces-
sary condition of liability .... But even if his disclosure conforms
to accepted medical practice, a physician nevertheless should be
liable if he fails to inform the patient of a significant risk of treat-
ment or of an alternative treatment. 0
Thus, Cornfeldt allows plaintiffs to establish the physician's breach
of duty by showing either failure to conform to accepted medical
practice, or failure to disclose to the patient a "significant risk," as
determined by the jury."
Next, the court analyzed the conflicting approaches to proximate
cause and found the minority view, or objective standard, to be the
"preferable measure."'" The court justified its choice on several
grounds. First, it recognized the difficulty in "reconstruction of [the
patient's] hypothesized state of mind" under the subjective test,
particularly when he is deceased or unable to testify, 3 Moreover, the
hindsight and bitterness that follow unsuccessful treatment are likely
to bias a patient's testimony of what he would have done if there had
been an adequate disclosure of risks." Finally, the court reasoned,
juries probably apply an objective test even when instructed to apply
a subjective one. 5
The adoption of a negligence cause of action for failure to disclose
material risks and alternative treatment in Cornfeldt represents an
overdue modernization of the doctrine of informed consent in Minne-
sota. Although the court did not discuss the implications of a change
to the negligence theory, two conflicting consequences appear to re-
to which the patient consented." 262 N.W.2d at 699 In other words, battery will be
the appropriate theory of liability when the issue is whether consent was in fact ever
given; negligence will be applied when the issue is whether the consent given was
informed.
38. 262 N.W.2d at 699-700.
39. Id. at 702.
40. Id.
41. See note 49 infra.
42. 262 N.W.2d at 701.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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sult.46 On the one hand, the criminal and intentional connotations of
battery will be avoided by describing the wrong as "negligence,"
thereby benefiting plaintiffs." On the other hand, plaintiffs must
show real damages to establish a cause of action in negligence; nomi-
nal and punitive damages will not be recoverable as they were under
the battery theory. 8
More important than the change in theory, however, is the
Cornfeldt court's adoption of the jury standard of care. By allowing
the jury to disregard customs of the medical community in determin-
ing reasonable conduct, the Cornfeldt decision bolsters the legal pro-
tection of individual autonomy.49 Few concepts are more deeply en-
trenched in Anglo-American law than the protection of individual
autonomy. John Stuart Mill has stated that "the sole end for which
mankind are [sic] warranted . . . in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number is self-protection."5 The professional
standard, however, jeopardizes individual autonomy. Commentators
have termed it "an unwarranted abdication of responsibility and of
the individual's right to make an informed choice to the medical
profession."'" Reasonable disclosure, as other courts have noted,5 2 is
not a scientific issue. Once the existence and gravity of a risk are
established by expert testimony, a layman is as capable as a physi-
46. A further, less significant, consequence is that collateral risks and risks of
alternative treatment must be disclosed under negligence but not under battery. 262
N.W.2d at 699; Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation
of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 124, 143-44. For further analysis of
the implications of the change in theory, see McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for
Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381 (1957).
47. Note, supra note 16, at 887.
48. Id. at 884.
49. The Cornfeldt decision may give more protection to self-determination than
the court realized. In making noncompliance with professional practice a "sufficient,
but not a necessary, condition of liability," 262 N.W.2d at 702, the court purported to
be making an "accommodation" between the patients' rights and professional compe-
tence. Id. But the court's approach merely gives plaintiffs the option of using expert
testimony regarding community practice. It may be assumed that the plaintiff will
always choose the higher standard of care. The court's rule thus benefits only plaintiffs
and is in no sense a compromise.
50. J. MuLL, On Liberty, in THREE ESSAYS 15 (1912).
51. 2 F. HARuER & F. JAMEs, LAw OF ToRTs 60 (Supp. 1968). Extensive comment
and investigation has been devoted to current information disclosure practices by
physicians. A summary of this literature, which shows that physicians often withhold
information that could affect patients' decisions, is found in Schneyer, supra note 46,
at 127-28. In addition, the HEW Commission on Medical Malpractice concluded that
there is a general need to promote fuller disclosure by physicians. SECRErARY'S MAL-
PRACTICE REPoirr, supra note 23, at 74. See generally E. FRMDSON, THE PROFESSION OF
MEDICINE 376 (1970) (patients are "more often bullied than informed into consent").
52. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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cian of deciding whether the risk is sufficiently serious to warrant
disclosure.n
The added protection of patient autonomy provided by the
Cornfeldt jury standard, however, is undercut by express or implied
limitations in the remainder of the court's opinion. While some limi-
tations seem necessary, perhaps inevitable, others do not.
Restricting the plaintiff to the objective test of causation imposes
unnecessary limitations on patient autonomy. That standard will
deny recovery to plaintiffs whose preferences do not conform to those
of tort law's mythical "reasonable person." For this reason, commen-
tators have justifiably attacked objective tests of causation applied
by other courts:
The very foundation of the doctrine is every man's right to forego
treatment or even cure if it entails what for him are intolerable
consequences or risks, however warped or perverted his sense of
values may be. . . . Individual freedom here is guaranteed only if
people are given the right to make choices which would generally be
regarded as foolish ones."
The better approach, therefore, would be to allow the plaintiff
to establish causation under either the objective or subjective test.
Admittedly, because the plaintiff is required to testify under the
subjective test, there is a danger of fabricated testimony. 5 Neverthe-
less, because the objective test fails to take account of the idiosyn-
cratic patient, the policy of individual autonomy requires that the
plaintiff have an opportunity to testify before the jury. Of course,
because the testimony is inherently self-serving and would undoubt-
53. Physicians, of course, cannot be expected to disclose risks of which they are
either unaware or cannot be expected to be aware. Thus, expert testimony is still
required to establish the existence of the risk and the physician's duty to be aware of
that risk. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d at 699 (citing Waltz & Scheuneman, supra
note 30, at 631).
54. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 51, at 61 (emphasis in original). For
further criticism of the objective test of causation in informed consent law, see Capron,
Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. Ray.
340, 420 (1974); Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 137, 160-64 (1977).
The causation requirement itself, whether objectively or subjectively tested, has
also been criticized since it serves to deny recovery to patients who would have con-
sented even if all the risks had been disclosed, but whose "dignitary interests" have
been harmed nonetheless by the inadequate disclosure. See Goldstein, For Harold
Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and
the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 690-98 (1975); Riskin, Informed Consent: Lookingfor the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580, 589. Denial of recovery to these patients is a
consequence of the change to negligence theory since, under battery theory, nominal
and punitive damages are available. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
55. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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edly evoke a rigorous cross-examination, trial tactics may often dic-
tate that the plaintiff use the objective test. But in those cases in
which the plaintiff would in fact have declined to undergo a given
procedure had the risks been fully disclosed, he should not be pre-
vented from explaining his decision simply because it does not meet
a reasonableness test.
The therapeutic privilege represents further interference with
patient autonomy; 8 this interference, however, is justified and una-
voidable. The long-standing" and well-recognized 8 therapeutic privi-
lege excuses the physician's failure to obtain informed consent where
disclosure might harm the patient or where the patient is so emotion-
ally distraught that he cannot make a rational decision."9 Clearly,
nondisclosure is justified in these situations. Since the therapeutic
privilege is established through expert opinion,1° recognition of the
privilege reintroduces expert testimony and allows defendant physi-
cians to call upon their colleagues to substantiate their claim to the
privilege. If a conspiracy of silence does exist in the medical com-
munity,6' it is likely to be reversed on an issue of therapeutic privilege
so that fellow physicians would "flock to the defense" of the ac-
cused.6"
The therapeutic privilege must be carefully circumscribed so as
not to undermine one of the purposes of the jury standard-avoiding
heavy reliance on expert testimony. This can be accomplished in
56. Although recognizing the existence of the privilege, the Cornfeldt court re-
jected a claim of the privilege by the two defendants. See 262 N.W.2d at 700.
57. See generally Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis
from Patients Sick with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TwN. L. Rav. 349 (1946).
58. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 30, at 641-43.
59. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972). See also Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 240 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. 1957)
(psychologically disturbed patients incapable of discussing risks and consequences of
electro-shock treatment); Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962)
(patient facing two major operations too emotionally tense to rationally interpret full
disclosure); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 191-95, 473 P.2d 116, 119-21 (1970)
(gravely ill patient apprehensive about condition not warned of collateral hazard).
60. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972). There appears to be some question about what an expert must testify
in order to establish the privilege. It has been suggested that because the claims are
so bound up in considerations particular to the patient in question, testimony regard-
ing community custom is inappropriate. Instead, testimony indicating that "sound
medical judgment" called for nondisclosure is required. See Waltz & Scheuneman,
supra note 30, at 643.
61. See note 23 supra.
62. See Hoffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234 P.2d 34,46 (1951) (Carter,
J., dissenting); Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical
Treatment, 1 ViL. L. Rav. 250 (1956); Katz, supra note 54, at 157; Riskin, supia note
54, at 587 n.47.
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several ways. First, the burden of establishing the privilege should be
placed firmly on the physician. 3 Second, the privilege should not be
recognized where the adverse patient reaction that the physician
fears is merely that the patient would make a foolish decision.64
Third, where a valid therapeutic privilege exists, the physician
should be required to obtain the informed consent of a close relative. 5
A final, similar obstacle to the protection of patient autonomy
is presented by the expert testimony requirements that remain under
the Cornfeldt approach to informed consent. After Cornfeldt, expert
testimony is still required to resolve two issues critical to the plain-
tiff's case: whether a risk in fact exists, and whether a physician
should be expected to know of that risk."6 As is true of the therapeutic
privilege, these issues are clearly technical and deference to the opin-
ions of members of the medical community is unavoidable. But,
again, the issues reintroduce expert testimony, allowing defendants
to use their colleagues' testimony to challenge necessary elements of
the plaintiff's case on scientific grounds. Little can be done to miti-
gate this problem. Courts hearing informed consent claims can only
seek to carefully adhere to the distinction implicit in Cornfeldt be-
tween establishing the existence and gravity of a risk, and establish-
ing a duty to disclose that risk. Once the expert testifies regarding
the probability that a given risk will materialize and that the defen-
dant should have known of that probability, the witness should not
be allowed to indicate his opinion as to whether the risk should have
been disclosed.
Cornfeldt v. Tongen represents a major revision of the doctrine
of informed consent in Minnesota. By analyzing the doctrine under
a negligence theory and adopting a jury standard of disclosure, the
63. It appears from the Cornfeldt opinion that the court has placed the burden
of establishing the privilege on the physician, since the court rejected the surgeon's
claim to the privilege simply on the basis of the inadequacy of the surgeon's testimony.
It was clear from that testimony that the surgeon "did not feel that disclosure of the
test results would be medically damaging to Mrs. Cornfeldt but only that he did not
want to concern her with what he regarded as a foregone conclusion." 262 N.W.2d at
700.
64. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 30, at 642.
65. Although there is no Minnesota law on the issue of whether the consent of a
near relative is required when there is a therapeutic privilege, such a requirement
surely exists. Other courts require the consent of a relative in comparable situations.
See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (underage patient); Pratt v.
Davis, 224 I1. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (insane patient) (dictum).
66. See note 53 supra.
67. This assumes, of course, that the plaintiff has not opted to rely on noncompli-
ance with the professional standard of practice as the method of establishing that the
defendant's conduct was unreasonable. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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decision represents a movement toward a more meaningful recogni-
tion of the patient's right to autonomous decisionmaking. Unfortun-
ately, the court's objective test of causation denied that right to all
but the "reasonable person." Satisfactory protection of this right is
also threatened by the therapeutic privilege and the remaining expert
testimony requirements. Refmement of the decision should include
a change to the subjective test of causation, careful circumscription
of the therapeutic privilege, and minimization of the required role of
expert testimony.
